Tying in International Trade by Marin, Dalia
Tying in International Trade: 
Evidence on Countertrade 
Dalia Marin 
1. INTRODUCTION 
OUNTERTRADE is tied trade. In a typical transaction a CPE or LDC 
imports goods and the exporting party - usually a firm in a western 
industrial country - commits itself to make an offsetting purchase at some future 
date. Since the mid seventies countertrade has become a significant phenomenon 
in international trade. Reasonable estimates vary between 10 and 20 per cent of 
world trade (see OECD, 1985; 1981).' Countertrade takes three main forms: 
barter, counterpurchase and buy-back. The three forms all entail linked export- 
import transactions, but they differ from each other in terms of whether they 
involve foreign exchange in the transaction, whether the two trade flows are 
temporally separated, and whether the trade flows stand in a technical relation to 
each other. Barter is a spot transaction in which the two trade flows occur at more 
or less the same time with no involvement of foreign exchange. Counterpurchase 
and buy-back, on the other hand, are long-term contracts with the two trade flows 
taking place at different points in time. Additionally, counterpurchase and buy- 
back involve financially separate transactions in which each trade flow is paid for 
in hard currency. In buy-back agreements the original export consists of a plant or 
technology and the repurchase of some portion of the output produced by that 
equipment, whereas in barter and counterpurchase there is no technical associa- 
tion between the original export and the offsetting purchase. 
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The growing importance of countertrade in international trade has started to 
attract the attention of international organisations who view countertrade as a 
return to bilateralism and reciprocity, and thus as a threat to the multilateral world 
trading system. This view is partly reflected in the fact that some forms of 
countertrade are being negotiated under the heading ‘trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMS)’ in the Uruguay Round3 (Greenaway , 1990; and Guisinger, 
1987). Whether countertrade is indeed an inefficient form of exchange will depend 
on whether or not any extra benefits from tying trade flows can be identified. 
Despite the prevalence of tying practices in East-West trade and North-South 
trade, however, the economics and empirics of countertrade is still in its infancy. ‘ 
This paper tries to fill this gap by providing an empirical analysis of counter- 
trade based on 230 transactions whose details were collected from trading house 
and firms involved in countertrade. Section 2 describes the data base and states the 
stylised facts of countertrade that need to be explained. Section 3 gives a critical 
review of the most frequent explanations of countertrade and confronts them with 
the data. In Section 4 I examine whether evidence of the theoretical gains from 
tying trade flows can be found in the data. The potential gains from tying 
considered in this section are those generated by restoring price flexibility in the 
presence of some market distortions, and those generated by preventing contrac- 
tual hazards associated with information asymmetry and ex-post bilateral mono- 
poly. Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings of the paper for trade 
policy and the GATT. 
2. THE DATA 
The data base consists of a sample of 230 completed countertrade agreements 
from international trading companies and producers in Vienna active in counter- 
trade. The sample has been generated by a survey in which the respondent (a 
countertrade specialist) has been asked to provide information on 40 aspects on 
one specific countertrade transaction. On average three countertrade agreements 
per firm have been investigated. Ninety per cent of the agreements covered took 
place between 1984 and 1988. In each agreement I distinguish between the 
developed country firm called ‘DC-firm’ who exports to a CPE/LDC and the 
countertrade partner called ‘CPE/LDC-party ’ . The ‘DC-firm’ is typically either a 
producer or a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise located in Austria with its 
own inhouse countertrade division or a firm in a western industrialised country 
’ For earlier discussions on countertrade and the GATT see Gadbaw (1983) and Czinkota (1987). 
Exceptions are Amann and Marin (1989, 1990). Chan and Hoy (l990), and Parsons (1985) who all 
argue that countertrade is a response to market distortions, information asymmetry, moral-hazard 
agency problems and incomplete markets. For the descriptive countertrade literature see OECD 
(1981, 1985), Korth (1987), Group of Thirty (1985). Economic Commission for Europe (1983). 
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who uses an international trading firm in Vienna to fulfill its countertrade 
purchasing obligation. Thirty per cent of the industrial firms are based in the 
European Community and 62.7 per cent in other industrial countries including 
Austria, Sweden, Japan, and the USA. The ‘CPEILDC-party’ is a state agency in 
a CPE or LDC (85.2 per cent of the cases), a state-owned enterprise (9.1 per cent), 
or a private firm (5.7 per cent) with which the western firm made the agreement. 
a. Trade Patterns 
Table 1 shows the forms of countertrade and their regional distribution. 
Counterpurchase dominates the other two forms of countertrade (76.5 per cent). 
East-West countertrade accounts for 86.5 per cent of the sample and 13.5 per cent 
is North-South countertrade which reflects Vienna’s role as an intermediary of 
East-West trade. It is worth noting that the LDCs tend to use buy-back and barter 
TABLE 1 
Countertrade: Forms and Region 
CPE s LDC s Total 
Barter 
Counterpurchase 
Buy-Bac k 
Total 
18 
(69.2) 
(9.0) 
158 
(89.8) 
(79.4) 
23 
(82.1) 
(1 1.6) 
199 
(86.5) 
8 
(30.8) 
(25.8) 
18 
(10.2) 
(58.1) 
5 
(17.9) 
(16.1) 
31 
(13.5) 
26 
(11.3) 
176 
(76.5) 
28 
(12.2) 
230 
(100.0) 
Note: Numbers without brackets are the absolute number of cases, numbers in brackets are row and column 
percentages, respectively. 
Source: Data Sample of 230 countertrade contracts 
The data base can be considered to represent the parent population of East-West countertrade since 
the sample covers a sufficiently large number of cases of all CMEA member countries involved in 
countertrade. More specifically, 14.8 per cent of the cases are with the USSR, 24.8 per cent with 
Czechoslovakia, 14.3 per cent with Hungary, 7 per cent with Poland, 4.3 per cent with Rumania, 6.5 
per cent with East Germany and Bulgaria, respectively, 6.1 per cent with Yugoslavia, and 0.9 per 
cent with Albania. That the data base is representative for East-West countertrade seems to be 
supported also by the evidence given in OECD (1981). The information on those dimensions of 
countertrade which is available in OECD (1981) is in broad accordance with our data sample. In 
contrast, among North-South countertrade 5.7 per cent of the cases are with Africa, 3 per cent with 
Asia, 2.6 per cent with South America, and 2.2 per cent with China. Hence North-South 
countertrade is not as well represented in the sample. 
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more frequently than the CPEs, who strongly favour counterpurchase (compare 
the column percentages 25.8 per cent vs 9.0 per cent for barter, and 16.1 per cent 
vs 11.6 per cent for buy-back). Table 2 shows that exports from OECD countries 
to the CPEs/LDCs consist mainly of plant, investment equipment and machinery 
(71 per cent of exports), while the CPEs/LDCs are quite successful in pushing 
non-traditional exports through countertrade (35.5 per cent of countertrade goods 
are investment and technical goods). Note also that the export of services 
(especially labour) is not uncommon among countertrade goods. 
TABLE 2 
Commodity Structure of Trade Flows 
Export goods4 Countertrade goods’ 
in per cent 
Plant and equipment’ 
Investment and technical goods2 
Chemical goods 
Consumption goods 
Basic sector goods 
Toys and cosmetics 
Services3 
Total 
14.3 
56.6 
8.8 
8.8 
3.6 
4.0 
4.0 
100.0 
0.0 
35.5 
8.2 
31.9 
18.4 
0.0 
6.0 
100.0 
‘Whole factory including managerial and technical assistance and investment equipment above US$ 10 million. 
*Investment equipment valued below US$ 10 million. 
31ncludes among export goods: know-how, patents and licences; among countertrade goods; labour services and 
freight. 
40ECD exports to CPEs/LDCs. 
5CPEs/LDCs exports to OECD. 
Source: Data Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
b. Tying 
There is a wide variety in the degree to which the two trade flows are tied 
together. As a measure of the degree of tying I use two indicators: the type of 
countertrade contract and the size of the compensation ratio. The compensation 
ratio is the value of repurchase by the DC-firm as a percentage of the original 
export value. Thus, a compensation ratio of 100 per cent means that the DC-firm 
makes an offsetting purchase equal value of its original export to the CPE/LDC. 
The compensation ratio varies between 2 and 400 per cent, as can be seen from 
Table 3 which looks at the relationship between type of contract and Compensation 
ratio. In almost 50 per cent of the contracts the parties opted for less than complete 
tying of trade flows by choosing a compensation ratio below 100 per cent. Among 
countertrade types, the buy back contract exhibits the strongest tie since, besides 
the technical linkage between the trade flows, buy-backs tend to have repurchase 
values that are equal or are higher than the original export value (75 per cent of all 
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buy-back agreements have a compensation ratio of 100 per cent or higher). 
Likewise, one tends to sign a counterpurchase agreement when desiring only a 
loose tying of commodity flows (59 per cent of all counterpurchase contracts have 
a compensation ratio below 100 per cent). The null hypothesis of independence 
between countertrade type and compensation ratio is rejected at the 1 per cent 
significance level, indicating that the forms of countertrade contract differ signifi- 
cantly in their degree of tying. 
TABLE 3 
Relationship Between Contract Type and Tying of Trade Flows 
Compensation ratio’ Barter Counterpurchase Buy-Back Total 
2% -99% 2 104 7 113 
(7.7) (59.1) (25.0) (49.2) 
100% 18 52 14 84 
(69.2) (29.5) (50.0) (36.5) 
101 % -400% 6 20 7 33 
(23.1) (1  1.4) (25.0) (14.3) 
Total 26 176 28 230 
(11.3) (76.5) (12.2) (100) 
Notes: Numbers without brackets are absolute number of cases; numbers in brackets are column percentages. 
Chi-square Value = 33.82; marginal significance level O.OO0. 
Value of repurchase by the DC-firm as a percentage of the export value to the CPEslLDCs. This figure is 
calculated as a ratio of values and not of units even in the case of barter since in the barter contract the parties use a 
foreign currency as a unit of account. ‘Ex ante’ compensation ratio valued at ‘declared’ prices, not world prices: 
see also footnote 2 of Table 4. 
Source: Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
c. Other Features 
Other basic features of contracts are shown in Table 4 which provides the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and a brief description of 
those dimensions of contract that are dealt with in this paper. The data base shows 
considerable variation also in other dimensions of contract like value (ranging 
from US$ 8400 to US$ 635 million, and duration (ranging from spot market 
transactions to long-term contracts of ten-year or even infinite time horizon). 
More than 50 per cent of the agreements are ‘fixed price contracts’ with no price 
adjustment for the countertrade goods over the duration of contract. Penalties for 
non-fulfilment of the countertrade obligation have been specified between zero 
and 100 per cent. It is worth noting that in 40 per cent of the transactions the 
penalty for breach is nil (not shown) indicating the high level of trust of the 
CPE/LDC-party in the conduct of the DC-firm. The high level of trust is not that 
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surprising given that in 65.6 per cent of the cases the DC-firm is familiar to the 
CPE/LDC-party from previous transactions. 
TABLE 4 
Some Contract Features 
Observations Description Mean Minimum Maximum Srandurd 
Deviurion 
Contract value 229 export value' I 117.9 8.4 635.000.0 47773.4 
Compensation ratio 230 value of repurchase in 71 38 2.0 400.0 51.0 
Penalty 227 penalty for breach in 7.15 0.0 100.0 10.70 
(in US$ IOOO) 
percent of export value2 
percent of export value 
(in months) 
adjustment over contract duration3 
Contract duration 230 rime span for repurchase 19 71 0.0 1 2 0 , ~  20.815 
Risk shifting 22 I price andlor quantity fixed price contract; dummy (D= I ;  56. I percent) 
Familiarity of exporter 227 frequency of exporting regular exporter; dummy (D=  I; 65.6 per cent) 
'To the CPEsILDCs 
?See footnote I of Table 3.  The table shows the 'ex ante' compensation ratio which is the ratio that the DC-firm and the LDCICPE-pany agree on in the 
contract Ex post - during contract execution - the ratio might turn out to differ from the ex ante ratio depending on the risk shifting features of the 
contract When prices andlor quantities of the countertrade goods are renegotiahle over the duration of the contract the ex ante and ex post 
compensation ratios will generally differ 
'See Table 7 for details. 
'Frequency of the DC-firms exporting to the CPEILDC: scaling: regular - occasional - first time exporter. 
'Excluding the a 
Source: Data Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
3 .  POPULAR EXPLANATIONS OF COUNTERTRADE 
One of the most frequent explanations of countertrade in the descriptive 
literature is that it allows countries to overcome the constraint on development 
imposed by a shortage of hard currency. Countertrade helps to finance imports 
without the use of hard currency thereby allowing the countries using it to 
overcome the foreign exchange constraint. A first look at Table 1 immediately 
reveals that this cannot be the main explanation. It is only barter that eases the need 
for foreign exchange by avoiding the use of money. In both counterpurchase and 
buy-back, the importing country typically pays for its goods in hard currency and 
receives hard currency when delivering the countertrade goods. Thus, the latter 
two forms cannot address a foreign-exchange shortage. Although barter might 
indeed reduce the need for hard currency, it accounts only for a small proportion 
of countertrade (1 1.3 per cent of total countertrade). If the foreign-exchange 
shortage were the main explanation of countertrade we would expect barter to be 
the main form of countertrade and the repurchase value to equal the original export 
value. In fact, however, counterpurchase and a compensation ratio of less than 100 
per cent dominate among countertrade. 
Another commonly advanced explanation of countertrade starts with the same 
phenomenon but reverses the argument. Instead of avoiding foreign exchange, 
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countertrade helps to generate it by promoting exports of the countertrading 
countries. Part of the source of the liquidity crisis in LDCs/CPEs is seen to have 
been created by increased protectionism in western industrialised countries which 
resulted in a reduction of foreign exchange earnings from exports. Countertrade is 
considered to generate additional foreign exchange by helping to overcome entry 
barriers in western export markets as the import is made contingent on the export 
of the countertrading country's product. How valid is this argument? Countertrade 
will promote exports when two conditions are met. First, that countertrade allows 
the countries imposing it to export goods they could not otherwise export. Second, 
that the countries can effectively segment the market when countertrade is used to 
create a new market for an already established product. Sales of the countertrade 
goods could cause displacement of traditional exports when they are sold at lower 
prices in the countertrade transaction than in traditional trade, and when the 
contracts are not endorsed with destiny clauses constraining or prohibiting the 
selling of the countertrade goods to third markets and third parties. 
TABLE 5 
Export Promotion' 
Goods and contract 
characteristics 
LDUCPE-party 
First time/occasional Regular 
exporter exporter 
Restriction on sale 
Yes 
no 
Marginal significance 
Chi-square Value 
Category of countertrade goods 
investment/technical goods 
chemicals 
consumption goods 
basic sector goods 
services 
Marginal significance 
Chi-square Value 
40.0 
41.1 
0.88 
0.024 
40.8 
59.1 
35.1 
33.3 
71.4 
0.105 
7.66 
60.0 
58.9 
59.2 
40.9 
64.9 
66.7 
28.6 
in percent2 
~ 
Countertrade goods exported for the first time or occasionally 40.2 
Higher price in countertrade export 26.6 
Lower price in countertrade export 10.6 
Restriction on resale 36.8 
Countertrade goods differentiated in design/quality3 51.8 
'Numbers are row percentages. 
20f  total countertrade. 
3Countertrade specialist's judgement of whether the countertrade goods are standardised/differentiated with 
respect to design and/or quality. 
Source: Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
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Whether countertrade has been effective in stimulating the export of non- 
traditional products is examined in Table 5 .  In 40 per cent of the transactions the 
CPEs/LDCs exported products through countertrade which they have not (or only 
occasionally) sold in the respective export market before. The table provides 
evidence also on the second prerequisite for additionality of exports. In 10.6 per 
cent of the contracts the countertrade goods have been potentially competing with 
non-tied exports. In order to avoid the displacement of traditional exports the 
contracts have been furnished with destiny clauses in 36.8 per cent of all 
countertrade contracts. 
The table also looks at whether regularly exported countertrade goods have 
tended to be more often endorsed with restriction on the resale in order to protect 
already established markets than when the countertrade goods have been exported 
for the first time. (One would expect this since goods which are exported for the 
first time are not potentially competing with non-tied exports. The null of no 
association between status of countertrade export and resale restriction, however, 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels. Consumption and basic sector goods 
have tended to be sold less often by countertrade when the LDC/CPE-party is a 
first time exporter than when it is a regular one, which is some indication of 
countertrade pushing non-traditional exports (the relationship is significant at 
about the 10 per cent level). 
Summing up, the empirical evidence presented in this section gives some 
support for the view that countertrade has helped to stimulate and diversify 
exports, 35.5 per cent of countertrade goods are investment and technical goods, 
5 1.8 per cent are goods differentiated in design and/or quality, 40.2 per cent of the 
countertrade goods have not or only occasionally been exported before, and in 
36.8 per cent of the cases countertrade has been used as an attempt to create a new 
market. 
Although export promotion through countertrade does seem to be consistent 
with our data, it still leaves open the question why these countries take recourse to 
countertrade to stimulate exports when less costly policies are available. If the 
countries imposing countertrade were to have a comparative disadvantage in 
marketing their exports, as is often asserted, why don’t they purchase marketing 
services from western trading companies in a traditional unilateral transaction? At 
first glance, countertrade seems to be a rather inefficient means of marketing a 
country’s exports. The answer to this question is dealt with in the next section. 
Whether the countries have, in fact, been successful in enforcing destiny clauses in order to secure 
additionality of exports can, however, not be decided on the basis of the data. Some observers have 
expressed scepticism about the enforceability of supplemented trade and have, therefore, asserted 
that countertrade will deflate prices of traditional exports leading to a deterioration of the counter- 
trading countries terms of trade in the long-run, see Goldstein (1984). 
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4. ARE THERE GAINS FROM TIED TRADE? 
An answer to the question raised in the previous section must start by explaining 
why tying trade flows might be a superior way of promoting exports than any 
alternative. Furthermore, any explanation of tied trade has to account for the 
contract characteristics given in Tables 1 to 4. To recall these: first, countertrade 
tends to be a mid-term to long-term fixed price/quantity contract in which the 
degree of tying varies considerably (as measured by the compensation ratio). 
Second, countertrade involves a high share of technology exports to the CPEs/ 
LDCs and third, among countertrade goods there is a high proportion of products 
which are differentiated with respect to design and/or quality. 
In this section I look at two main possible sources of benefits from linking trade: 
the presence of market distortions and informational imperfections to which 
countertrade is a second-best solution. For each of the potential gains I examine 
whether they are consistent with actual countertrade contracts. 
a. Correcting Market Distortions 
In order to look at whether tying arrangements can outperform untied ones I 
focus first on the factors that create an incentive for countertrade only when the 
DC-firms and/or countertrade partner’s market is non-competitive. The existence 
of widespread distortions in the form of imperfect competition and collusive 
agreements creates a second-best environment in which countertrade might induce 
efficiency gains by correcting deviations from competitive conditions. To illus- 
trate this consider the following two examples. Suppose the countertrade partner is 
an LDC and a member of an international price agreement (like OPEC or an 
International Commodity Agreement). Suppose further that the LDC is faced with 
surplus capacity for whatever reason. Under these circumstances the LDC will 
want to undercut the cartel price. One way of doing so without openly violating the 
collusive agreement is to use barter. The LDC sells the countertrade goods at the 
official price and takes an overpriced good from the DC-firm. The lack of 
transparency in barter makes it an effective route for chiselling. ’ Circumventing 
collusive agreements via countertrade might account for why the LDCs use the 
barter form of countertrade more frequently than the CPEs (as is shown in Table 
1). 83.3 per cent of the agreements in which the CPE/LDC-party is a member of a 
cartel are signed with LDCs. * 
’ The argument is analogous to the monopoly reasons for vertical integration, see Tirole (1988). 
However, here tying allows partners to restore price flexibility, while vertical integration allows the 
monopolist to exercise monopoly power in a hidden way. 
In 1984 10 to 20 per cent of oil exports from OPEC countries are estimated to have been bartered, 
see Banks (1983). 
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Another example in which barter becomes attractive is when the market 
distortion takes the form of the DC-firm being a price discriminating monopolist 
selling to a CPEILDC. As is well known the price discriminating monopolist can 
increase profits by asking different prices from customers with different levels of 
willingness to pay. Assuming that consumers in LDCdCPEs have a lower 
reservation price for western products, and that the DC-firm is constrained in the 
exercise of its monopoly power, barter allows the monopolist to discriminate in a 
hidden way by obscuring the effective price from disfavoured customer. From the 
LDCs/CPEs perspective, barter is a way to extract monopoly rents from the 
DC-firm. 
If price distortion plays a role as a source for barter, I expect to find that the size 
of the compensation ratio agreed on will vary systematically with the DC-firms’ 
market power and with whether or not the CPE/LDC-party is a member of a cartel 
or a collusive price agreement. In this case the size of the compensation ratio will 
be the outcome of a bargaining process reflecting the partners’ bargaining power. 
Table 6 provides evidence on the association between the compensation ratio, the 
DC-firms’ market position, and the status of the CPE/LDC-party. Leading 
producers tend to have contracts with compensation ratios below 100 per cent 
(56.6 per cent of all contracts signed with DC-firms that are leading producers 
have a compensation ratio between 2 and 99 per cent) while the reverse is the case 
for DC-firms with negligible market shares. The null hypothesis of independence 
between the compensation ratio and the DC-firms market position is rejected by 
the Chi-square test. A similar result is obtained for the DC-firms’ competitive 
conditions (not shown). If the CPE/LDC-party is a member of a cartel the contract 
is more likely to specify compensation ratios of 100 per cent or above. The 
relationship is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
In barter transactions with no money involvement, the compensation ratio 
determines the terms of trade of the transaction. A low repurchase value as a 
percentage of the export value means unfavourable terms of exchange for the 
DC-firm and favourable ones for the CPE/LDC-party. The results given in Table 
6 suggest, therefore, that the greater a party’s monopoly profits the worse terms it 
gets in the countertrade contract. Amann and Marin (1989) give a rationale for this 
result. In a bargaining game with assymetric information a high DC-firm profit 
margin signals to the CPE/LDC-party that it can make a less favourable offer to 
the DC-firm without increasing the probability of the DC-firm rejecting it. 
b. Tying as an Incentive Device 
As has been shown in the previous section some form of deviation from 
competitive conditions can account for tied trade. Viewed in this way tying is a 
See Amann and Marin (1989); for the price discrimination hypothesis see Caves and Marin (1990). 
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vehicle to change the terms of trade. The market distortion hypothesis for 
countertrade, however, fails to explain why countertrade mostly entails long-term 
contracts with a low degree of price adjustment over the duration of the agree- 
ment, and why in countertrade agreements OECD exports to the CPEslLDCs 
include a significantly higher share of technology trade as compared with untied 
trade to these regions. This suggests that, by itself, the monopoly reason for 
countertrade is an incomplete explanation. 
TABLE 6 
Relation Between Market Distortion and Tying 
Compensation ratio 
< 100% 100% > 100% 
Countertrade 49.1 36.5 14.3 
DC-firms market position 
leading producer’ 67.0 56.6 32.9 10.5 
follower 9.3 38.1 52.4 9.5 
one among many 23.8 35.2 37.0 27.8 
Marginal significance 0.0050 
Chi-square Value 14.86 
Status of CPELDC-party 
member of cartel2 2.6 0.0 83.3 16.7 
administered price3 77.3 53.1 32.8 14.1 
none of both 20.1 39.1 45.7 15.2 
Marginal significance 0.043 
Chi-square Value 9.83 
Note: Numbers are row percentages. 
‘Countertrade specialist’s judgement of whether the DC-firm is a leading producer in terms of market share 
and/or technology. 
*Oil cartel or commodity agreement. 
3Regulated prices in agriculture, administered prices in planned economies. 
Source: Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
In this section I look at an alternative rationale for tying trade flows in which 
countertrade is seen as a response to an incentive problem caused by incomplete 
contracting in relationships where parties have to make irreversible investments. 
The partners are ‘locked into’ the relationship ex post because of investments that 
have considerably higher value within the relationship than outside it. lo This view 
requires that the parties know at the date of agreement that there will be gains from 
trade between them to be exploited later. In order to induce the efficient amount of 
relationship specific investment ex ante these future gains have to be divided 
properly. If one cannot specify ex ante how the surplus should be divided because 
l o  Williamson (1985) calls an investment that gives an incentive to stay in the relationship ‘asset 
specificity’ and calls the threat by one party of not trading to appropriate a greater share of the surplus 
after specific investments have been made ‘opportunism’. For recent literature see Crawford (1988), 
Farrell and Shapiro (1989), and Rey and Salanie (1990). 
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writing a complete contract is not feasible, the division will depend on ex post 
bargaining positions. Under bilateral monopoly each party will want to appro- 
priate the common surplus, thus threatening the efficient realisation of trade ex 
post and through it the efficient amount of specific investment ex ante. Transform- 
ing the transaction from an untied to a tied one offers safeguards against the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour thereby securing the parties the return from 
their investment in an expost non-competitive bargaining environment. l1 In other 
words, tying may enjoy comparative organisational advantages over more stand- 
ard forms of untied trade because the parties' commitment to the contract is more 
credibly signaled by their willingness to accept reciprocal exposure of specialised 
assets. The offer of hostages - as Williamson (1983) calls it - makes the 
commitment to the contract credible, thereby mitigating contractual hazards. 
In order to see how these problems may arise concretely in the context of 
countertrade consider the following case. Consider a CPE/LDC that is faced with 
a shortage of foreign exchange. Given the constraint, the CPE/LDC is more risk 
averse when deciding what to produce for future exports. It will scrutinise 
carefully competing choices for the use of productive resources with respect to 
their prospects of generating future foreign exchange earnings. In this situation 
futures markets would be valuable since they would provide information on future 
market conditions for the product that the CPE/LDC considers producing and 
additionally would offer insurance against random fluctuations in price and 
demand. By selling the product forward, the CPE/LDC can eliminate the risk 
from its foreign exchange earnings by having a guaranteed price over the period 
for which the futures market is open. In this way futures markets guarantee that an 
investment today is generating foreign exchange earnings in the future, making the 
present foreign exchange constraint less binding. In the absence of such perfect 
risk markets the CPE/LDC will look for alternative ways to insure itself against 
the market risk it faces. The CPElLDC will make market entry of DC-firms 
contingent on the provision of a private futures market. The CPE/LDC will 
negotiate with the DC-firm for a forward contract in which the DC-firm commits 
itself to purchase at a future date the products that the CPElLDC considers 
producing. If the DC-firm agrees to such a contract countertrade serves as an 
insurance against future price fluctuations and the fact that an agreement is 
reached will give a signal to the CPE/LDC on the future demand for the product. l 2  
In order to be able to offer such a contract to the CPE/LDC the DC-firm will 
need to undertake some upfront investment to build up marketing and distribution 
channels for the countertrade goods. The reason why the provision of a futures 
market requires up-front investment on the part of the DC-firm lies in the fact that 
" The bargaining position of the parties will no longer be independent from the organisational 
setting in which it is placed when contracts need to be revised or complemented during execution; see 
also Klein et al. (1978) and Grossman and Hart (1986) in the context of vertical integration. 
' *  For countertrade as an insurance contract see Amann and Marin (1990). 
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the CPEsILDCs face a reputational barrier to entry on western markets due to 
western consumers having incomplete information on the quality of the goods 
coming from these regions. The bad reputation of goods coming from the 
CPEs/LDCs will change among western consumers only after having some 
experience with them. In order to induce western consumers to start to purchase 
these products the DC-firm will need to undertake special marketing efforts. 
However, the investment in marketing the countertrade goods exposes the 
DC-firm to contractual hazards of two kinds. First, the risk averse CPE/LDC who 
is provided with the insurance will have little incentive to meet the quality 
requirements for the countertrade goods common in western markets. This will, in 
turn, threaten the DC-firms profits since lower quality products are harder to sell 
on world markets at a profitable price. Moreover, the western firm will not be able 
to separate whether the failure to supply the countertrade goods at western quality 
standards is due to low effort on the part of the CPE/LDC or due to other 
circumstances. Thus, information asymmetry creates a control problem by intro- 
ducing a fundamental trade-off between risk sharing and incentives (see Stiglitz, 
1974). Second, the CPE/LDC will have an incentive to remove products which 
have become established on western markets - due to the DC-firms’ marketing 
efforts - from the countertrade shopping-list, since the DC-firm made a commit- 
ment to purchase from the list as it stands at a later date. The western firm who has 
built up a marketing network for the countertrade goods will, however, be ‘locked 
into’ the relationship ex post since it will not easily find alternative uses for its 
investment. The investment in marketing the countertrade goods has considerably 
higher value when it stays in the relationship with the CPE/LDC than when it 
leaves it. Faced with the possibility of ‘hold up’ the DC-firm will not agree to 
provide a futures market that requires transaction specific investment. 
In order to encourage the DC-firm to undertake special marketing efforts for the 
countertrade goods which is a prerequisite for its successful introduction on 
western markets a tying arrangement is signed that guarantees the DC-firm a fair 
return expost on its investment in order to induce it ex ante to undertake specific 
investment. The contract guarantees the DC-firm a fair return on its investment 
because the tying feature of the agreement will equally expose the CPE/LDC to 
contractual hazards of the following kind. Typically, the CPE/LDC will buy 
technology and machinery from the DC-firm in the countertrade contract. As is 
well known, as a technology seller the DC-firm has private information on the 
quality of the technology which creates an incentive to supply low quality. l 3  By 
transforming the transaction from an untied to a tied one and by committing the 
technology seller to repurchase a portion of the output produced with his tech- 
nology - as in the buy back contract - the incentive of the technology seller to 
I f  This has become known as the ‘lemons’ problem in which good quality is driven out by bad 
quality, see Akeriof (1970). 
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supply low and outdated technology is weakened when the quality of countertrade 
goods will depend on the quality of the delivered technology. 
But even if the quality of the technology is common knowledge as is the case for 
standardised machinery, the CPE/LDC as the technology buyer will still be 
exposed to another type of contractual hazard of the DC-firm as the technology 
supplier. The CPE/LDC will depend on the technology seller to reveal and 
provide technology updates and after sales service once it has purchased the 
technology. Similar to the exposure of the DC-firm when providing the futures 
market, the CPE/LDC will be ‘locked into’ the relationship with the original 
technology supplier when requiring services at contract execution. The CPEs/ 
LDC’s dependence on the technology supplier will let the DC-firm exploit its 
monopoly position by overpricing the provision of spare parts and other services. 
By making both partners mutually dependent on each other - the DC-firm on the 
supply of countertrade goods at western quality levels and the CPEs/LDCs on the 
provision of after sales services and technological improvements - they credibly 
commit the reliability of their future conduct. Neither product will exploit the 
dependency of the other. 
In order to see whether the above story is consistent with actual countertrade 
contracts consider Table 7 which looks at the relation between some of the contract 
features and the degree of tying. Recall that in countertrade 75 pzr cent of all 
exports to the CPEs/LDCs consist of technology and machinery and 52 per cent of 
countertrade goods are differentiated in design and quality. If tying is a response to 
incentive problems associated with technology trade on the one hand and the 
provision of a private futures market on the other. I expect to find the degree of 
tying to be related to the characteristics of trade flows. This is indeed the case. 
Countertrade contracts which involve a technology export to the CPEs/LDCs tend 
to have lower compensation ratios as compared to those contracts that do not 
consist of technology exports. The relationship is significant at the one per cent 
level. l4  Similarly, when the western firm repurchases differentiated countertrade 
goods from the CPE/LDC the compensation ratio is either below or above 100 per 
cent. 55.2 per cent of all contracts in which the countertrade good is differentiated 
in design and/or quality have a compensation ratio below 100 per cent (as 
compared to 39.8 per cent when the countertrade goods are standardised). The 
degree of differentiation (see footnote 2 in Table 7 for definition) is used here as an 
indicator for whether the DC-firm had to make upfront investments for the 
successful introduction of the countertrade goods on western markets. It is 
assumed here that the less standardised the countertrade product the more 
marketing efforts the DC-firm will be required to undertake to provide the futures 
l 4  The reason for this is that in general the technology that the DC-firm provides in the contract has a 
high transaction value so that already a small compensation ratio locks the DC-firm sufficiently into 
the relationship by hurting its profits in case of contractual hazards moving its incentives in the right 
direction. 
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market. The association between the degree of differentiation of the countertrade 
goods and the compensation ratio is significant at the one per cent level. 
TABLE 7 
Incentives and Tying 
Compensation ratio 
< l o o %  100% > 100% 
Characteristics of export goods 
investment, technology, know howl 
others 
marginal significance 0.000 
Chi-square Value 34.91 
Characteristics of countertrade goods 
standardised2 
differentiated3 
Marginal significance 0.064 
Chi-square Value 10.095 
Contract duration4 
short-term 
mid-term 
long-term 
Marginal significance 0.001 1 
Chi-square Value 18.28 
Risk shifting5 
fixed price and quantity 
fixed price, flexible quantity 
fixed quantity, flexible price 
flexible price and quantity 
Marginal significance 0.097 
Chi-square Value 14.76 
75.5 - 59.0 
24.5 19.6 
48.2 39.8 
51.8 55.2 
50.0 36.5 
42.6 62.2 
1.4 58.8 
43 .O 39.4 
10.9 38.9 
7.8 68.0 
34.3 53.2 
32.9 8.1 
46.4 33.9 
48.1 12.0 
27.6 17.2 
41.7 21.7 
31.6 6.1 
29.4 11.8 
42.4 18.2 
38.9 22.2 
28.0 4.0 
34.2 12.7 
Note: Numbers are row percentages. 
'See footnote 1 and 2 in Table 2 for definition 
*Judgment of countertrade specialist: scaling = standardised product in quality and design. standardised in 
quality but not design, standardised design but not quality. 
'Not standardised product with respect to quality and design. 
4Short-term: includes spot transactions and contracts with a time horizon of up to one year; mid-term: contracts 
with duration of up to 5 years; long-term contracts with duration of up to 10 years or infinite time horizon. 
'Degree of price/quantity adjustment for countertrade goods over duration of contract. 
Source: Sample of 230 countertrade contracts. 
Alternatively, Table 7 looks also at whether the provision of a futures market 
can account for the tying feature of countertrade. Whether countertrade will be 
effective in shifting market uncertainty to the DC-firm will depend on two 
attributes of the insurance contract. First, on whether the time horizon of the 
contract is sufficiently long. The longer the duration of the contract the higher the 
risk for the DC-firm of unanticipated market changes and the more effectively will 
the CPEs/LDCs be able to plan their exports. 
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Second, on whether the parties agree to fix prices and quantities of the 
countertrade goods over the duration of the contract or whether prices and 
quantities will be subject to renegotiation. When prices and quantities are fixed 
over the time horizon of the contract, the DC-firm absorbs the risk of future 
changes in market conditions, while if both prices and quantities are renegotiable 
the countertrading countries are less effectively insured against future market 
fluctuations. Both features, the duration of contract and the degree of price/ 
quantity adjustment over time are shown in Table 7.  The null hypothesis of 
independence between contract duration and risk shifting on the one hand and the 
compensation ratio on the other has been rejected by the Chi-square test at the one 
and ten per cent significance level, respectively. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT 
This paper provides an empirical foundation of countertrade based on 230 
contracts that have been signed between firms from OECD countries and CPEs 
and LDCs in the period between 1984 and 1988. The paper looks at whether 
evidence can be found in actual countertrade contracts that indicates gains from 
tying trade flows. The data indeed give some support for the view that tied trade 
might outperform untied ones which questions the common view that countertrade 
is an inefficient form of exchange. Tied trade might be superior to untied ones for 
the following reasons. First, countertrade might be used as a vehicle to change the 
terms of trade in the presence of market distortions thereby restoring price 
flexibility. Second, countertrade might be a response to moral hazard incentive 
problems that arise in technology trade on the one hand and in risk sharing 
arrangements on the other. In other words, because there is a two-way flow the 
two parties involved in the contract are more equally exposed, thereby preventing 
opportunistic behaviour when it comes to renegotiation during contract execution. 
Moreover, the ex post ‘hold up’ problem during contract execution between the 
CPE/LDC as the producer and the DC-firm as the provider of a private futures 
market might explain why CPEs and LDCs use countertrade rather than traditional 
unilateral transactions as an export promoting policy. Countertrade then promotes 
exports of countertrading countries in two different ways. First, by changing the 
terms of trade, countertrade can be viewed as an export subsidy that is financed by 
the DC-firm. l6 Assuming that the CPEsiLDCs face a reputational barrier to entry 
on western markets, the subsidy - by lowering the prices for the countertrade 
goods - makes western consumers learn faster the true quality of the goods 
I s  For the factors determining the degree of risk shifting see Amann and Marin (1990). 
l 6  For countertrade as an import-financed export subsidy see Amann and Marin (1989). 
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coming from these regions by giving them an incentive to start to purchase them. ” 
Second, by its tying feature countertrade provides the firms in OECD countries 
with an incentive to invest in informing western consumers about the true quality 
of the countertrade goods thereby assisting the LDCsKPEs in overcoming the 
entry barrier in western markets. 
The implications from what has been said in the paper are the following 
Countertrade is not likely to disappear in the near future. Since countertrade is not 
a response to weaknesses in the planning system but a second-best outcome in the 
presence of market imperfections, the former CPEs can be expected to continue to 
use countertrade even after transformation to a market economy. The extent to 
which countertrade arrangements will prevail in the future will depend on whether 
the economic transformation in Eastern Europe will allow these countries to solve 
their foreign debt problems on the one hand and on the extent of which other 
institutional forms will replace the tying arrangements as a way of dealing with the 
incentive problems associated with technology trade and risk sharing. A substan- 
tial permanent reduction in foreign debt will most likely also reduce the need for 
countertrade as an insurance against fluctuations in future foreign exchange 
earnings. l 8  The removal of the foreign ownership constraint in the former CPEs, 
in turn, will induce some shift from tying arrangements to transactions within 
firms like joint ventures and foreign direct investments in those cases when’the 
latter prove to have comparative institutional advantages over tying arrangements 
in dealing with the incentive issues raised in the paper. 
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